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Death in Theological Reflection 
by 
Prof. Germain Grisez 
The author is Flynn Professor of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary's 
College, Emmitsburg, Maryland. The following was prepared for an 
assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life, held at the Vatican in 
February, 1998. The entire proceedings were printed as The Dignity of 
the Dying Person, which can be ordered along with two other volumes on 
the internet at www.vaticanbookstore, <academy>. 
Introduction: The Subject Matter and Limits of This Paper 
In this paper, I shall criticize three mistaken views of death. Proponents 
of euthanasia are likely to employ these views in their propaganda, and 
Christians, misled by them, are likely to be impeded from safeguarding life. 
These mistaken views are of concern to theology inasmuch as they claim 
a basis in faith and/or seem to some Christians to pertain to faith. But I shall 
show that all of these views are incompatible with truths of Catholic faith. 
I shall not deal here with the implications of theological mistakes 
about death for matters other than euthanasia, such as the pastoral care of the 
dying and the bereaved. Nor shall I deal with all the implications of a 
sound Christian conception of death - for example, the need to face up 
to the prospect of death, to prepare oneself realistically, and to accept death 
with confident hope when it cannot be rightly avoided or reasonably 
resisted. Nor shall I take up theological arguments for euthanasia whose 
unsoundness involves no mistake about death or compassion. I Though I 
shall discuss the views of some theologians, I shall not make a survey of 
the many theologies of death proposed by recent and contemporary 
theologians. Nor shall I deal with mistakes about death that have no 
theological basis - for example, the materialist view which, denying that 
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human persons have souls that continue to exist after their death, rejects 
the very possibility of resurrection.2 
I. Death as the Liberation of the Spiritual Person 
In the Phaedo, Plato portrays Socrates preparing to die and comforting his 
friend by arguing that the intellectual soul is immortal and that, at least for 
a true philosopher, death permanently releases the spiritual self from its 
encumbering body for a better life. The view can be reformulated, using 
a dualistic concept of person that Plato lacked: human persons are nonbodily 
selves that have and use bodies; death can benefit such spiritual persons by 
freeing them from their bodies, when these are no longer useful. 
Though this dualistic concept of the human person has influenced and 
continues to influence the thinking of many Christians, it generally remains 
unstated. I know of no contemporary Catholic theologian who explicitly 
defends the dualistic notion that death liberates the spiritual person. 
However, the underlying dualistic logic continues to influence many.3 And 
Joseph Fletcher, writing as an Episcopalian moral theologian, 
straightforwardly asserts dualism: 
Physical nature - the body and its members, our organs and their 
functions - all of these things are a part of "what is over against 
us," and if we live by the rules and conditions set in physiology or 
any other it we are not men, we are not thou. When we discussed 
the problem of giving life to new creatures, and the authority of 
natural processes as over against the human values of 
responsibility and self-preservation (when nature and they are at 
cross purposes) , we remarked that spiritual reality and moral 
integrity belong to man alone, in whatever degree we may possess 
them as made imago Dei. Freedom, knowledge, choice, 
responsibility - all these things of personal or moral stature are 
in us, not out there. Physical nature is what is over against us, out 
there. It represents the world of its. Only men and God are thou; 
they only are persons.4 
When discussing euthanasia, Fletcher approvingly quotes from a statement 
by a group of ministers supporting its legalization: "We believe in the 
sacredness of personality, but not in the worth or mere existence or 'length 
of days. ' " He adds: "In the personalistic view of man and morals, asserted 
throughout these pages, personality is supreme over mere life. To prolong 
life uselessly, while the personal qualities of freedom, knowledge, self-
possession and control, and responsibility are sacrificed is to attack the 
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moral status of the person. It actually denies morality in order to submit 
to fatality."5 
The view that death liberates the spiritual person is theologically 
refuted by the refutation of the dualistic conception of the person that 
underlies it. That conception is at odds with Scripture: exegetes agree 
that the sacred writers of both the Old Testament and the New conceive 
of the human being nondualistically, as a living whole that includes flesh, 
psyche, and spirit.6 The human person is neither the body nor the soul 
taken separately, but a unity involving both. Vatican II clearly affirms: 
the human person is "a unity of body and soul."7 Because of this unity, a 
person's body is not like clothing that he or she possesses and wears but 
could do without. 
True, the image of God in human beings primarily is in their 
intelligence and ability to make free choices.8 But the human body also 
shares in the dignity of that image.9 Only insofar as human persons are 
bodily can they be male or female, and this differentiation contributes to 
their being in God's image, as Paul VI teaches: "The duality of sexes was 
willed by God so that man and woman together might be the image of God 
and, like him, a source of life." lo John Paul II likewise teaches that God 
creates human persons in His own image and likeness, not only insofar as 
they are intelligent and free, but also insofar as they are made for 
communion with one another, empowered to procreate, and given dominion 
over the rest of the material world. II 
In explaining the sanctity of human life, John Paul II points out an 
important consequence of the person's unity: 
All human life - from the moment of conception and through all 
subsequent stages - is sacred, because human life is created in 
the image and likeness of God. Nothing surpasses the greatness or 
dignity of a human person. Human life is not just an idea or an 
abstraction; human life is the concrete reality of a being that lives, 
that acts, that grows and develops .. . 12 
Human life is the concrete reality of human persons. For them, as for other 
organisms, to be is to live, and to die is to cease to be. 13 
What, then, of the soul? Definitive Church teaching makes it clear 
that this spiritual element of the person survives and subsists after death, 
and that it will experience heaven or hell. 14 However, the Church also 
teaches definitively that until death the soul is the "form" of the living 
human body. 15 In the technical sense in which form is used here, it refers 
neither to a mere quality of something nor to a complete reality, but to the 
intrinsic principle that makes a material thing be the kind of bodily reality it 
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is . So, this Church teaching means that one's soul is not oneself, but 
rather is a spiritual constituent of oneself that, until death, makes the stuff 
of one's body to be a human person. 16 
If human persons were spiritual beings whose death was their 
liberation, the raising of the body would be no blessing; rather, it would 
pointlessly and cruelly reimpose a burden. 17 But, since a human being is a 
unity of body and soul, dying is the human person's loss of concrete reality 
- his or her ceasing to be. That is why human salvation must involve 
bodily resurrection, as St. Thomas explains: "A person naturally desires 
the salvation of himself or herself; but, since the soul is part of the human 
body, it is not the entire human being, and my soul is not I ; so, even if the 
[disembodied] soul reached salvation in another life, neither I nor any 
human being would thereby do SO." 18 
II. Death as a Person's Destruction from Without 
and Consummation from Within 
During the thirty years or so before Vatican II, several Catholic 
theologians, responding to mostly similar concerns, published innovative 
accounts of death. While expressly rejecting body-soul dualism and 
avoiding open conflict with the Church's teaching about the substantial 
unity of the bodily person, these accounts, like dualistic theories, held death 
to be intrinsically necessary for human fulfillment and so, in itself, a 
benefit for the human person. I do not know that any of those theologians 
drew the conclusion that euthanasia can be justified for the sake of that 
benefit. But they all held the benefit to pertain to death itself, rather than 
to death only as a condition for entering into heavenly glory. And they 
claimed that the benefit accrued in a posited life-consummating free human 
act, which they referred to as the very act of death. These accounts easily 
lend themselves to rationalizations of euthanasia and are likely to 
confuse those working against it. 
The different theologians ' innovative accounts of death diverge in 
some important respects. 19 But, except where noted, the differences are not 
significant for the purpose of this reflection. So, I shall simply summarize 
and criticize the more troublesome common features of the accounts. 
All seem to be responding mainly to two challenges: first, a 
philosophical challenge, arising from atheistic existentialism, to explain 
how Christians can live authentically in this world despite their beliefs 
about the next, which seem to trivialize the prospect of death; second, a 
theological challenge to explain how death seals human destiny, so that 
the blessed will be unable to sin and the damned will be unable to repent. 
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Martin Heidegger posed the philosophical challenge. Recognizing 
that death destroys the person and hoping for nothing beyond this life, 
Heidegger tried to show how the prospect of death can lead a person to 
be decisive and to live an authentic human life. Though products of 
heredity and environment, human persons have creative intelligence and 
freedom, so that they can take possession of themselves and, within 
limits, decide what they will be. Even so, they tend to follow natural 
inclinations or waste themselves in functional relationships and the 
superficialities of daily life. Yet the prospect of death is an always - present 
part of one's life, and dread of one's own prospective utter nothingness calls 
one to focus on oneself in isolation from all that distracts. In definitively 
ending one's life, death will realize one's most personal possibility and 
totally isolate one. Thus, Heidegger thinks, honestly anticipated death 
concentrates the mind, excludes distracting possibilities, and provides a 
unifying principle for living a unique life. The life of someone who 
accepts this principle has a definite purpose: to exercise freedom in 
opting for a limited set of possibilities. Thus, authentic living toward 
death frees one to live a whole or complete life in which one creatively 
makes, if not the most of oneself, at least something of oneself.2° 
Plainly, according to Heidegger's view, Christian hope negates the 
existential value of death and facilitates evasion of the responsibility to 
live authentically. The theologians who responded to this challenge 
uniformly rejected Heidegger's individualistic ideal of self-fulfillment 
and affirmed the truth of faith that human fulfillment is to be found only 
in communion with God and others, a communion that requires genuine 
mutual self-giving and other-accepting. Some of the theologians also 
mention what all of them surely would affirm: that by the free and self-
determining act of baptismal faith, the Christian, empowered by the Holy 
Spirit, has died and risen with Christ - that is, has given up his or her 
unauthentic self for the sake of authentic self-possession and self-
realization .21 Again, some take into account and none denies that carrying 
out the baptismal undertaking requires Christians continually to die to 
self by putting to death the deeds of the flesh so as to live toward death 
with the hope of rising with Christ to everlasting lifeY And all surely 
would agree that, when Christians become aware of their own impending 
death, they should humbly accept the inevitable as God's will and 
prepare themselves to receive his judgment. 
But for the theologians who proposed innovative accounts of death, 
these considerations, by themselves, did not seem an adequate response 
to the challenge to show that Christian faith does not trivialize death. 
They felt it necessary to try to explain how the death that seemingly 
happens to human beings much as it does to other organisms directly 
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engages a person's freedom. So, extrapolating from the human 
experience of the interplay throughout life of freedom and of necessity 
- that is, of all that is beyond one's control - they posit an exercise of 
freedom in the very moment of death itself, and maintain that a human 
person not only suffers death but does it.23 
For these theologians, then, death is an act. Moreover, it is not 
simply one act among others: "The all-important act of our earthly life is 
its very last act, whereby becoming yields its place to being. It is the act 
of death."24 No prior act is so truly one's own: "Death is man's first 
completely personal act."25 It is not simply acquiescing in the inevitable: 
"In an act of such decision it appears possible that the personal freedom 
of the composite person could be engaged to an extent hitherto 
unrealized."26 For the act of death fulfills the acting person precisely as 
such: "This act has to be free, as its very essence shows; it is the passage 
of a free being to the definitive stage which its liberty has prepared."27 In 
sum, in the opinion of these theologians, Heidegger's challenge is 
adequately answered by their conception of death: "As the end of man, 
who is a spiritual person, it [death] is an active consummation from 
within brought about by the person himself. It is a growing up, the result 
of what man has made of himself during this life, the achievement of 
total self-possession. It is the real self-creation, the fullness of his freely 
exercised personal reality."28 
For Heidegger, however, the prospect of death puts human freedom 
to work on the realization of this-worldly possibilities, while for the 
theologians who regard death as consummation from within, the act's 
object is the person's eternal destiny: either fulfillment in heavenly 
communion or isolation in defiant autonomy. Either option, they 
suggest, somehow resolves the tensions among all the tentative, 
particular choices an individual has made during his or her life, gathers 
them up, and definitively completes them.29 Thus, they hold, the blessed 
cannot sin because their free act of death completely determines them 
to heavenly communion, and the damned cannot repent because their 
free act of death completely determines them to defiant autonomy. In this 
way, these theologians think, their theory responds also to the theological 
challenge to explain how death seals human destiny. 
This conception of death as a consummating option is theologically 
unsound for at least two reasons.3D 
First, it is a matter of faith that humankind's first parents suffered 
death as a punishment for their sin, and that even their descendants who 
commit no personal sin (except Jesus and Mary) inherit original sin and 
face death as its punishment.31 Now, for anything to be a punishment, it 
must be repugnant to those who experience it. But nobody finds repugnant 
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the exercise of his or her own freedom. Therefore, death cannot be a 
consummating exercise of freedom. 
The theologians who claim that death is such an exercise respond 
by distinguishing between death as destruction from without and death as 
consummation from within, and by saying that sinless humankind would 
have engaged in the latter without undergoing the former: ''This end of man 
in Paradise, a death without dying, would have been a pure, apparent and 
active consummation of the whole man by an inward movement, free of 
death in the proper sense, that is, without suffering any violent dissolution of 
his actual bodily constitution through a power from without."32 
But this answer raises further questions. If active consummation 
would have occurred in Paradise without death in the proper sense, why 
should the comparable act of fallen humans be regarded as the act of 
death rather than simply as an act occasioned and conditioned by death? 
Again, why call an act that is free of death in the proper sense an act of 
"death," and why say that people in Paradise would have "died without 
dying"? If not simply nonsense, such talk is misleading. Plainly, it serves 
only one purpose: unless the consummating exercise of freedom would 
somehow have been death for sinless humans, it cannot be the act of 
death for us. Thus, the theologians who posited a consummating act of 
freedom would have stated their position more simply and clearly had 
they said, not that it is "the act of death," but that it is an act which, for 
fallen humankind, is occasioned and conditioned by death.33 
At least some of those theologians would answer that in fallen 
humans the consummating exercise of freedom is an act of death because 
by it the person as a whole relinquishes life, so that the body's activity 
ceases and the soul's activity disengages itself.34 But that answer would 
not help, for, even if the dying person freely gives up the ghost or that 
person's soul freely lets go of his or her body, that act of death cannot be 
identified with the posited consummating option. For that hypothesized 
option has a different object: fulfillment in heavenly communion or 
isolation in defiant autonomy. 
At least one of these theologians would answer that the final option 
precisely is to make or to refuse an ultimate act of self-surrender, to resign 
oneself with faith to destruction or to resist the ultimate self-emptying of 
death. 35 Initially, this might seem cogent: it makes the consummating 
option bear directly on death. But what sense does it really make to speak 
of self-surrender in the moment of death? With one's last breath, one can 
commend one's soul to God, resigning oneself to a foreseen but not yet 
present inevitability - "Father, into your hands I commend my spirit" (Lk 
23.46) - or one can refuse to do so. But when one is actually overtaken by 
death, one has no time left for acting. The time for self-surrender is past. 
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The second reason for the theological unsoundness of the conception 
of death as a consummating final option is, ironically, the very theological 
challenge to which these theologians were attempting to respond, 
namely, that people who die in God's love can never lose it, and people 
who die in mortal sin can never repent.36 This truth pertains to Catholic 
faith. 37 Therefore, it is theologically untenable to hold that anybody can 
make a final option for or against God after death. 
Recognizing this problem, a proponent of the theory of final option 
can say that it "occurs neither before nor after death, but in death" and that to 
hold that the fmal option takes place after death would "be contrary to the 
Church's teaching on the unalterability of the state a man reaches through 
his death."38 Thus, some proponents insist that the option pertains to the 
whole person, somehow including the body,39 and some that it occurs in 
the very moment of death, which, they argue, is not yet after death.40 
But all of them, when focusing on the uniqueness of the final 
option by contrast with all the acts that precede it, refer to the one making 
the option. In doing so, they inadvertently reveal what sort of acting 
subject is required to make a final option. "Freedom was indispensable 
for the acts of earthly life, because they exercised some definite 
influence; surely freedom is indispensable for the act which definitely 
settles everything. The personal self was whole and free when it was 
confined to the body and shared in its servitudes; it must be so all the 
more at the moment of liberation."41 "In disengaging itself from the body, 
the soul freely assumes a consistent attitude to the world of values that 
was not realizable to this extent before. It wills as spirit what is forced 
upon it as body - its own temporary separation from the body."42 "If at 
the moment of separation, of death, the soul is active, its activity is of the 
same nature as that of the separate intelligences."43 "In death the 
individual existence takes its place on the confines of all being, suddenly 
awake, in full knowledge and liberty. The hidden dynamism of existence 
by which a man has lived until then - through without his ever having 
been able to exploit it in its fullest measure - is now brought to 
completion, freely and consciously."44 
The subject of the hypothesized final option must be the personal 
self no longer confined to the body, the soul willing as spirit, the soul 
acting as the angels act, the individual existence no longer located in the 
physical universe. But during the time of an acting person's life, it is not 
the soul that deliberates, freely chooses, and acts. Rather, it is the bodily 
person, alive by his or her informing soul, who acts by exercising not 
only spiritual capacities of intelligence and freedom but capacities of 
imagination, feeling, and so on - capacities that involve bodily organs. 
So, the subject making the supposed final option cannot be the acting 
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person, the bodily person informed by his or her soul. Rather, the subject 
of such a consummatory act could only be a soul no longer informing a 
bodily person. 
A soul no longer informing a bodily person is the surviving 
spiritual element of a person who has died. So, even though these 
theologians speak of the body's involvement and of a final option at the 
very moment of death, it is clear from their references to the one making 
the option that it could only be made after death. But an after-death 
option that could change one's eternal destiny is theologically untenable. 
And positing a final option that could not affect one's eternal destiny 
would be theologically pointless. For such an option could not save 
anyone overtaken by death in un-repented mortal sin, and that possibility 
was what made the idea of a final option intriguing. So, the conception of 
death as a consummating final option is theologically unsound, being 
either untenable or pointless. 
What, then, of the challenges to which the innovative theologies of 
death attempted to respond: the philosophical challenge to show how 
Christians can live authentically and take death seriously, and the 
theological challenge to explain how death seals human destiny? The 
latter challenge was poignantly articulated by one of the innovative 
theologians. He considered the theory of final option the only alternative 
to "the puerile concept of final perseverance which seems to regard God 
as engaged in a whimsical game, calling one to eternity from a sort of 
ambush so that if one happens to be in the state of grace at the moment, 
so much the better for him, if not, so much the worse."45 
Clearly, the challenges were formidable for theologians imbued 
with a legalism that regarded this life as nothing but a probationary 
period and regarded moral norms as arbitrary divine commands 
constituting a kind of test, with heaven the reward for obedience and with 
hell the punishment for disobedience. So, a sound response must begin 
by recalling that God, who does nothing arbitrarily, acts always 
according to his wise and loving plan, and that moral norms articulate 
necessary conditions for human persons' cooperation in carrying out that 
plan. In God's all-embracing, providential plan, each person has a role to 
play: a life of good deeds prepared for him or her to walk in, a personal 
vocation.46 If a person not only responds to the splendid truth about 
human good embodied in moral norms but discerns, accepts, and 
faithfully fulfills his or her unique personal vocation, that person follows 
the way of the Lord Jesus; contributes to God's creative, redemptive, and 
sanctifying work; and day by day prepares in this world material that, 
purified and perfected, will be found again in the eternal and universal 
kingdom.47 . 
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Such a life, of course, will not meet Heidegger's standards for 
authenticity. But Catholic theologians, having recognized that 
Heidegger's this-worldly ideal of human fulfillment is incompatible with 
faith, should have seen the inadequacies of his standards. The lives of 
eminent contemporary Catholics such as Mother Teresa and John Paul II 
- not to mention the less familiar but no less noble devout lives of many 
Christians through two millennia - have hardly been frittered away in 
pursuing distractions and evading the challenges of being truly human. 
Rather than creating their own plan of life, that cloud of witnesses 
humbly responded to God's can and played their part in His plan. 
Walking by faith , none of them could understand the full meaning of his 
or her life or appreciate its full excellence without the anchor of hope 
which, extending beyond the curtain into the heavenly sanctuary,48 does 
indeed rob death of the existential ultimacy and majesty it has from 
Heidegger's point of view. But his point of view plainly was profoundly 
flawed: Heidegger opted for Nazism.49 
God does not cut off anyone's life arbitrarily. Despite any 
imperfections and repented infidelities, those who are saved by grace 
complete the work assigned them in God's plan and only then die: their 
lives are His handiwork, and the divine artist rests only when He finishes 
a master work.50 To those who are not saved, God gives sufficient grace 
- everything they need - to walk in the life of good deeds He offers 
them. But, despite whatever human value their lives involve, on some 
occasion, perhaps many occasions, they consider doing something 
gravely wrong, realize that they ought not to do it, yet freely choose to do 
it; and although before death they may consider repenting, they freely 
choose to put off doing so - or choose not to do so at all. So, one should 
not imagine that they merely happen not to be in the state of grace when 
death overtakes them. Nor is there anything whimsical in God's 
treatment of them. His plan includes permitting and using their lives for 
the benefit of others and the kingdom as a whole. Thus, when such 
people die, they have, though unwittingly, served God's good purposes in 
causing them to live and in tolerating their abuse of the capacity to make 
free choices. 
I do not think revelation tells us how death seals human destiny, 
and I am not sure that speculation on the matter is likely to be fruitful. 
But the personality development of those recognized as great saints is 
suggestive. They become single-minded and single-hearted, so that 
almost all their thoughts and opinions are consistent with their faith, and 
almost all their choices implement their hope, which is their intention of 
the kingdom as ultimate end. Their feelings and behavioral dispositions 
become more and more harmonious with their minds and hearts. And so, 
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loving with nearly their whole minds, hearts, souls, and strength, they 
serve others in obedience to God's creative, redemptive, and sanctifying 
plan and will. Thus, notable sanctity comes about through the integration 
of virtually all the other elements of a human person's complex reality 
with the gift of faith and the love of God poured forth in his or her heart.51 
The separated soul has less to integrate than a bodily person does: 
feelings and behavioral dispositions no longer are in play. And, even in 
this life, thoughts and intentions can be inconsistent only so long as the 
inconsistency is not directly focused upon. Perhaps the separated soul is 
incapable of inattention and self-deception, or perhaps it is helped to 
resolve its inconsistencies, so that its spiritual life becomes fully 
integrated. This would require no new choice of its own and no 
extraordinary divine act. Through this process, the souls of those who die 
in God's love could be purged and perfected in holiness, while other 
souls were integrated around the dominant elements of the worIdviews 
and intentions that replace faith and hope when people violate charity. 
Given complete integration, holy souls would no longer be subject to 
temptation from within,52 and those lacking charity would no longer be 
able to take an interest in anything that would give them a reason to repent. 
Nor need the resurrection of the body alter either group's situation. 
True, resurrection will re-create bodily persons in all their human 
complexity, but each person will rise in his or her very own body, 
perfectly adapted to his or her unique spiritual life of God-given holiness 
or self-determined depravity. 
III. Death as Good in Itself If Due to an Act motivated by Charity 
Out of love for His heavenly Father and for us, Jesus laid down His 
life; out of love for God and neighbor, Christian martyrs have followed 
Jesus in laying down their lives. Not only were Jesus and the martyrs 
morally upright and holy in this, but in some real and important sense 
their deaths were good: Jesus' death was salvific, and martyrs' deaths 
have been the seed of faith . Plainly, too, many devout Christians have 
considered their own prospective deaths a good to be hoped for: they 
have prayed for death, just as for other blessings. From these facts some 
will infer that death motivated by charity is not something bad but rather 
something good in itself. And in some cases, they will go on to argue, 
charity apparently motivates the choice to end one's own or another's 
life. For example, some compassionately choose to die to spare others the 
trouble and expense of caring for them, and some compassionately 
choose to kill someone who has no prospect of gaining or regaining good 
health and a normal life in order to spare that person (and others) the 
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suffering involved in and consequent upon his or her miserable life. 
Therefore, those proposing the argument will conclude, killing motivated 
by compassion can be called euthanasia in a true sense and is justified 
inasmuch as the death it brings about is good. 
Though the premises leading to the final conclusion of the 
preceding argument may seem true, the conclusion is decisively falsified 
by the Catholic Church's moral teaching excluding euthanasia, for that 
teaching surely is true and unchangeable.53 So, the argument as a whole 
must be unsound. Its unsoundness is due to several confusions and shifts 
of meaning, all of which can be cleared up by careful reflection. I shall 
begin with the confusions in the second half of the argument. 
One of these concerns compassion. In many places in the Old 
Testament, God is said to be compassionate, and His people often appeal 
to His compassion. Though the words used perhaps signify feelings of 
sympathy, when said of God they refer not to emotions, which cannot be 
ascribed to Him, but to an aspect of divine perfection: God's mercy, 
which is the form his faithful love takes in overcoming evil,54 In the New 
Testament, Jesus' actions often are said to be motivated by compassion,55 
and here the word plainly does refer to His human feelings. However, 
Jesus always subordinated every feeling, including compassion, to His 
commitment to do the Father's will. So, Jesus' compassion was 
integrated with and governed by His merciful human and divine love. 
Thus, compassion has two meanings. In one sense it refers to a 
virtue - mercy - and in another sense to an emotion. As a virtue, mercy 
is morally good and disposes one only to do what is right. As an emotion, 
compassionate feeling is neither morally good nor evil in itself. It is 
simply a natural response of human beings, who are not isolated from 
one ,another, as individualists suppose, but are mutually interdependent 
members of an extended family. 
Though the natural feeling of compassion is not morally good or 
evil in itself, it is morally significant in two ways. First, compassionate 
feeling integrated with mercy, as it was in Jesus, shares in the virtue's 
goodness, while the lack of appropriate compassionate feeling, 
heartlessness, manifests moral immaturity, selfishness, or even hatred. 
Second, compassionate feeling which is not integrated with mercy often 
inclines people to act unreasonably - and so immorally, even if 
blamelessly due to lack of sufficient reflection. The unreasonable 
response can be of different sorts. Very often, people moved by 
compassion omit fulfilling responsibilities so as to avoid inflicting pain 
or hardship. Sometimes, though lacking adequate skill or resources, 
people compassionately try to help others and the well-meaning effort 
only makes matters worse. Again, and even more seriously, those driven 
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by feelings of compassion for people who are obviously suffering 
sometimes condone or take part in serious injustices.56 
Thus, unless integrated with the virtue of mercy, compassionate 
feelings may fail to bring practical wisdom into play and all too often 
lead to the folly of trying to achieve good by doing evil. That is precisely 
what happens when compassion moves people to commit suicide in order 
to spare others or to kill others, at their request or not, in order to end 
their suffering. 
The moral ambiguity of compassionate feelings often is overlooked 
today. Contemporary culture has been influenced by secularism, which 
usually regards altruistic sentiments as a sound guide to right or wrong. 
Pain and suffering are widely regarded not only as intrinsically evil but 
as the worst evils, while pleasure and enjoyment are regarded as 
intrinsically good and even as the highest goods. Morality often is 
reduced to doing what one can to minimize pain and suffering and to 
maximize pleasure and enjoyment. Many people who do not believe 
in God find this view congenial because it locates the ultimate 
principles of morality in human experience rather than beyond it. 
Many also like the way it displaces traditional morality 'S focus on 
intelligible, fundamental goods - fidelity, marriage itself, human life 
- and makes way for a permissive new morality regarding sex, 
marriage, and killing. Even some believers now fail to distinguish the 
feeling of compassion from the virtue of mercy and uncritically accept 
secularist ideas.57 
Keeping this distinction in mind, however, one can easily see that, 
even if motivated by feelings of compassion, a choice to kill oneself or 
another is no exercise of charity but rather is gravely contrary to it. As was 
explained in Section I above, life is a person's concrete reality and death is 
his or her ceasing to be; a choice to kill a person is therefore a choice to 
destroy him or her. But charity creates, sustains, nurtures, and cherishes; it 
never destroys. Therefore, loving self and neighbor with charity and acting 
with authentic mercy, one never will choose to kill oneself or anyone else. 
Does it follow that one always must do everything possible to 
sustain life and may never do anything that will bring about anyone's 
death? Not at all. To see why, one must understand the structure or 
morally significant human actions, which carry out free choices. 
In making a choice, one generally chooses to do something. (If one 
can and should do something but chooses not to do it, the adoption of that 
proposal also is a human action - an act of omission - but for 
simplicity 's sake I shall not repeatedly mention omissions here.) Before 
choosing, individuals deliberate about options they consider possible and 
interesting - I could do this or that - much as a deliberative body 
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debates options proposed in members' motions. A choice to do something 
adopts a proposal just as a group's vote does, and in both cases the action 
is completed by carrying out what is decided. One's specifically human 
action is the unified whole: the choice by which one adopts a proposal 
together with (and shaping) the behavior by which one carries it out. 
Since the carrying out of the choice is what is proposed by the 
acting person, carrying it out is the immediate goal of his or her choosing 
(the acting person's "proximate end"). The acting person's purpose in 
adopting the proposal also is an end - the real or apparent good hoped 
for in making the choice (the "end in view"). (In many cases, a person 
has more than one end in view. Here and in what follows, end refers to 
those cases as well.) Thus, in choosing to do an action, a person can be 
said to intend both the choice's execution and the end in view. Rut intend 
also can be contrasted with choose and used to refer exclusively to the 
willing of ends in view, whether intermediate or ultimate. And the 
execution of the choice can be thought of, not as the proximate end of 
choosing, but only as a means of pursuing the end in view. 
In any case, acting persons do not do everything that results from 
their actions. Whenever carrying out a choice involves outward behavior, 
that behavior has effects neither included in the acting person's proposal 
nor in his or her end in view. For example, taking medication for an 
allergy may cause drowsiness. Sometimes, such effects are not foreseen, 
but even if they are, they are not part of the person's action. Rather, they 
are side effects of it. Still, since an action's foreseen side effects could be 
avoided by not choosing to do the action, a person who makes a choice 
while foreseeing that carrying it out will have side effects freely accepts 
those side effects and, in doing the action, knowingly brings them about. 
So, people bear some responsibility for their actions' side effects, and 
that responsibility is easily confused with their responsibility for choices 
they reluctantly make.58 
With this explanation in mind, one can see that a person can bring 
about someone's death without choosing to kill or intending death as an 
end in view, but only accepting death as a side effect. Doing that can be 
wrong. For example, without intending to kill, one might wrongly bring 
about one's own death by abusing drugs, or another's death by stealing 
something that person needs for survival. 
But one also might rightly bring about one's own or another's death 
as a side effect of an upright choice. For example, if no better means of 
easing the suffering of a dying patient is available and sedation will not 
prevent him or her from fulfilling exigent responsibilities, the narcotics 
necessary to suppress the patient's pain may be administered so as to 
suppress it, even if it is foreseen that doing so will have the side effect of 
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shortening life.59 Contrast that action with a homicidal choice in an 
empirically similar situation: desiring to shorten life so as to eliminate 
pain (and perhaps other burdens) but wishing to leave no evidence of 
suicide or homicide, someone might choose to use the same analgesics 
- perhaps, but not necessarily, in a larger dose.60 
Similarly, a choice not to do everything possible to keep someone 
alive can be homicidal, but also can be morally acceptable and even 
obligatory. Suppose, for example, a baby is born with severe abnormalities 
including a life-threatening heart defect, for which the attending pediatrician 
recommends surgery. If the parents, wanting only normal children, 
decide to refuse the surgery so that this baby will die, their choice is 
homicidal. But the parents of a similar baby might well be justified in 
accepting the child's death as a side effect of caring for him or her as best 
they can while forgoing the surgery so as to avoid the burdens that they 
need not, and perhaps ought not, accept. (Available health care personnel 
and facilities may be deficient, so that the prospect of the surgery's 
success might be low; the parents may be poor, so that paying for the 
surgery would deprive their other children of necessities .) Not obtaining 
the surgery in such cases would not carry out a homicidal choice. The 
child's death due to the unrepaired heart defect would be the side effect 
of a choice - probably morally good and perhaps even obligatory - to use 
available resources in other ways of caring for that child and the others. 
It is worth noticing that in some cases people using ordinary 
language or legal terminology speak of a death that was not intended, in 
the ethical sense I have just explained, as "intentional", meaning foreseen 
and voluntarily brought about. For example, if the owner of a failing 
business set fire to his shop in order to collect the insurance, not 
expecting the night watchman to escape the flames, many people who 
learned of the crime and some courts would say that the watchman's 
death was intentionally brought about by the arsonist, even though the 
death was neither anything he chose nor any purpose he had in view. 
However, such other legitimate ways of talking about action do not 
invalidate the distinction I have explained, though they do underline the 
importance of bearing in mind two things: (1) that in the sense of intends 
explained here, one intends only what one chooses to do or has as an 
intermediate or ultimate purpose in making a choice; and (2) that people 
who foresee and wrongly accept bad side effects cannot truthfully excuse 
their immorality by saying that what they did was "unintentional" -
meaning unforeseen and/or involuntary. 
Some who accept the preceding explanation nevertheless will 
argue that the distinction between what one intends and what one accepts 
as a side effect cannot explain how publicly authorized killing in war and 
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as capital punishment, which most Christians have considered morally 
acceptable, can be justified. Since the law of charity requires love even of 
enemies, does not Christians ' approval of capital punishment and war 
show that choosing to kill people is compatible with loving them? 
It is true that most Christians, denying or ignoring the incompatibility 
between choosing to kill wrongdoers or aggressors and loving them, have 
supposed that under certain conditions public officials were justified in 
ordering people to be killed in wars and as capital punishment. Most 
Christians' reflection about the matter focused, not on the good of human 
life, but on the supremacy of divine law. They thought that God's 
commandment forbidding killing protected only the innocent, and that 
God had directed public authorities to safeguard the common good by 
intentionally killing those who wrongly threatened it. During the present 
century, however, authentic theological development has made it clear 
that God's negative commandments protect fundamental human goods, 
and papal teaching has endorsed that development.61 
Accordingly, the popes increasingly focused on the limits of the 
legitimate use of deadly force by public authorities. Pius XII took a 
crucial step in maintaining that only defensive wars can be justified.62 
Recently, the Catechism of the Catholic Church has used morally 
acceptable individual self-defense, in which the death of an aggressor is 
not intended but only accepted as a side effect, as the model for the 
legitimate use of deadly force by public officials .63 So, the Catechism 
offers only one sort of reason why public authorities might be justified in 
authorizing lethal military actions and in executing criminals. In the 
former case, it says: "The defense of the common good requires that an 
unjust aggressor be rendered unable to cause harm"; in the latter, it says: 
"Assuming that the guilty party's identity and responsibility have been 
fully determined, the traditional teaching of the church does not exclude 
recourse to the death penalty, if this is the only possible way of effectively 
defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.64 Thus, Catholic 
teaching now indicates that even publicly authorized killing cannot 
rightly carry out a choice to kill. Therefore, the teachings on killing in 
war and as capital punishment no longer provide reasons for holding that 
intentionally killing someone can be compatible with charity. 
Having clarified the confusions in the second half of the argument 
for euthanasia set out at the beginning of this section, I tum now to 
confusions in the argument's first half, which led to the claim that death 
motivated by charity is good in itself. That claim was based on a 
particular understanding of several facts: Jesus laid down His life out of 
love, and His death was salvific; Christian martyrs also have laid down 
their lives and their deaths have helped spread the faith; and devout 
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Christians seem to consider death good inasmuch as they hope and pray 
for it. These facts raise two questions. First, did Jesus and the martyrs 
consider death good, and do devout Christians who pray for death 
consider it good? Second, did Jesus and the martyrs intend their deaths in 
laying down their lives, and do devout Christians intend their deaths in 
praying for death? 
As I have shown in section I, above, a person's dying is the loss of 
his or her concrete reality - is his or her ceasing to be - which cannot 
be good in itself. Still, one's prospective death can seem good, and 
reflection on various ways in which death can come to seem good will 
help answer the two questions. 
Prospective death can seem good insofar as it seems to offer a 
possible way of avoiding ongoing suffering. This is how nonbelievers 
who choose to kill themselves or others, as euthanasia, regard death. Not 
regarding life as good in itself but as a necessary condition for enjoyable 
experience (and, perhaps, other goods), they consider life no longer good 
when it has served its purpose. Death, likewise, seems to them neither 
good nor bad in itself, but bad if it robs someone of still-useful life and 
good if it ends "useless" life and suffering. 
At the emotional level, there are no distinctions between means and 
ends, between what it good in itself and what is good by reference to 
something else. Whatever is perceived or imagined either does or does 
not elicit desire and promise satisfaction, and whatever does so, seems 
good. But since death itself, the person's ceasing to be, is unimaginable, 
in trying to imagine their own deaths, people imagine themselves 
somehow surviving, perhaps dualistically as an ethereal self flying 
happily away, but probably more often as a hidden but still living person 
- as in the image resentful children form of watching their own funeral 
and enjoying their parents' grief. When devout Christians imagine their 
own death, they picture themselves reaching heaven: perhaps being 
admitted by Peter, ushered into a private audience with the Lord Jesus, 
and then rejoining loved ones. Therefore, though perceptions or images 
connected with death usually elicit fear or anger, one's own imagined 
death can and often does seem good. 
At the intellectual level, a death - that is, someone's dying, not his 
or her being dead - can seem humanly good due to the human values 
that lead to it and flow from it, without seeming good either as an end to 
be intended or as a means to be chosen. For example, the death of a 
fireman resulting from a successful attempt to rescue a four-year-old girl 
from her flaming home is, in a true sense, beautiful and good. While the 
fireman perhaps deliberately risked death, he did not choose to die; if he 
foresaw the fire's lethal effect, he knew it would contribute nothing to the 
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rescue. His death draws its goodness from his heroism and from the life 
he saved. Yet these reasons for the goodness of the fireman's death also 
are the reasons for wishing he had not died: his death is no benefit but a 
tragedy for him and a great loss to his loved ones and the community. So, 
even while contemplating this heroic death with admiration and joy, 
survivors bitterly grieve over it and, perhaps, seek ways of making it 
more likely that firemen doing their duty in the future will not only 
succeed but survive. 
When the fireman began to carry the little girl through the flames, 
she no doubt found the prospect of being exposed to them both terrifying 
and good. Why good? Because it was an obviously and absolutely 
necessary condition for reaching safety in her parents' arms. Still, for her, 
being exposed to the flames was not a means of escape: she had no 
choice and did nothing to bring it about. But even if she had anticipated 
the rescue and called for help, she need not have chosen to be exposed to 
the flames as a means to safety, for she could have accepted that as an 
inseparable part of being rescued - of being delivered from a hopeless 
situation into her parents' arms. 
The child's thinking in this way about going through the flames is 
also the way in which devout Christians can and, I believe, often do think 
of death. They do not regard death - the loss of their concrete reality -
as a possible means to anything. On the contrary, they realize that it is a 
punishment for original sin and will remain a great evil until the end of 
time: "The last enemy to be destroyed is death. " 65 So, such Christians do 
not imagine that killing themselves could benefit them. But they do think 
that undergoing death is an inseparable part of being saved, reaching 
heaven, being raised up in etemallife.66 Thus, when they pray for death, 
devout Christians really are praying for their integral salvation. They 
explicitly focus on death for the same reason that the little girl might cry 
out: "Carry me through the flames!" That inseparable part of being 
rescued must come first in time; being associated with safety, it arouses a 
desire powerful en'ough to overcome terror. 
Someone will object that the foregoing analogy is imperfect. When 
we ask others to do something for us, we intend their action as an 
intermediate end that will be a means to some further end in view; and 
praying for death is asking God to bring it about so as to reach heaven: 
"Lord, I think I have lived long enough; please take back my life." There-
fore , it seems, in praying for death devout Christians do intend that God 
act to end their lives - in other words, they intend that God kill them. 
Perhaps some do. If so, they confusedly intend their own death, 
which objectively is wrong. Yet they are guiltless not only because they 
lack sufficient reflection but because they mean to submit to God and 
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assume that His act of killing will be good. Interestingly, though, devout 
Christians praying for death seldom seem to think of themselves as asking 
God to kill them. A common way of praying for death, "Please let me die," 
suggests that the anticipated death would be a side effect of God's doing 
something other than killing. "Please exchange my present life for 
resurrection life" perhaps best expresses the attitude of devout Christians. 
In any case, though God's plan includes one's death, God neither 
can nor needs to bring it about by an act of killing. He cannot kill, 
because killing is destructive while His intention in acting always is 
loving and creative; He need not kill because creatures never are 
independently existing things confronting God but always are entirely 
contingent on His mind and will. So, death comes to a human being when 
God ceases to sustain his or her life, and God's not indefinitely sustaining 
people's lives is a side effect of His unique act of creating, redeeming, 
and sanctifying the created universe.67 
The preceding clarifications are easily applied to the death of martyrs. 
On the one hand, as human values lead to and flow from the heroic 
fireman's dying, so important values lead to and flow from martyrs' 
dying. But whereas most of the benefits of the fireman's heroism would 
have been realized even had he survived, the martyrs' very dying greatly 
contributes to the effectiveness of their witness. Then too, a martyr's 
death is better than the death of a hero who lays down his or her life for 
goods lesser than loyalty and obedience to God. For the martyr plainly 
manifests not only natural virtues but the theological virtues of faith, 
hope, and charity. All this, of course, generally is recognized by martyrs 
themselves, and it provides their main reason for laying down their lives. 
Moreover, confidently anticipating heavenly happiness, martyrs often 
emotionally exult in their suffering and dying. 
On the other hand, Christian martyrs, for the most part very clearly, 
do not choose to do anything in order to get themselves killed, but only 
accept death as a side effect. Many use every morally acceptable means 
to avoid being killed, and accept death only when they see no alternative 
except to sin. Even those who could refrain without sinning from the act 
that brings about their death, generally choose to do the act for the sake 
of its immediate good effect, and only accept death as an inevitable and 
foreseen side effect: St. Maximilian Kolbe saved the other man by taking 
his place, which involved accepting death as a bad side effect. If Kolbe 
had miraculously survived several weeks longer than he did and allied 
forces had liberated the camp soon enough to save him, that would not 
have frustrated his intent in taking the other man 's place.68 
Of course, some martyrs do appear to have intended to die. For 
example, St. Ignatius of Antioch, a bishop condemned to death for his 
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faith during the reign of Trajan (98-117 A.D.), sent a letter to the 
Christians at Rome as he was being brought there for execution. In it he 
wrote: 
I am writing to all the Churches and I enjoin all, that I am dying 
willingly for God's sake, if only you do not prevent it. I beg of 
you, do not do me an untimely kindness. Allow me to be eaten by 
the beasts, which are my way of reaching to God. I am God's 
wheat, and I am to be ground by the teeth of wild beasts, so that I 
may become the pure bread of ChriSt.69 
Despite appearances, St. Ignatius in writing this passage may well have 
meant only to warn his fellow Christians against trying to save his life by 
actions that would be either intrinsically wrong (such as lying or 
compromising the Church's teaching) or gravely imprudent (such as unduly 
risking their own or others' lives or provoking the public authorities to 
persecute the Church more severely). If such intentions were the only ones 
Ignatius had in writing, he did not intend to die but only accepted death. 
Still, one might consider that interpretation implausible and hold 
that, intending to die as a means of reaching God, Ignatius plainly chose 
to dissuade fellow Christians from doing what they might reasonably 
have done to prevent his death. According to that view, in intending that 
others not act to save him, Ignatius intended his own death, though 
without the accurate understanding of what he was doing that would have 
made it a mortal sin of suicide rather than the act of charity it was.70 
What is true of most, if not of all, martyrs also is true of the king of 
martyrs, our Lord Jesus. His very dying flowed from and led to great 
goods: it was the consummate act of His divine and human redeeming 
love, and it is salvific for fallen humankind. Since Jesus laid down His 
life to save us, His death cannot be called "unintentional" as if it were in 
no way voluntary; He clearly did foresee and freely accept His death. Yet 
Jesus did not choose to do anything in order to bring about His own 
death nor did He intend His death as a means to our salvation or anything 
else. Rather, at an early age He committed Himself always to do nothing 
but His Father's will, and He faithfully fulfilled that commitment by 
carrying out the mission He was given.7 1 Seeking to gather Israel together 
as the nucleus of the new covenantal community, which is the beginning 
of the everlasting kingdom of God, realizing that His effort was not 
bearing fruit, and foreseeing that He would be killed, Jesus nevertheless 
obediently went up to Jerusalem to inaugurate the kingdom. And at the 
Last Supper, He did inaugurate it, while freely accepting as a side effect 
of doing so the death He would suffer the next day.72 
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This act, which includes Jesus ' laying down His life without 
intending His death, accomplished humankind's reconciliation with God. 
On the one had, that sacrificial act of self-giving consummated His life of 
perfect human love for the Father, and the sacrifice not only would last 
forever but, through the sacraments, would be available for those whq 
heard and accepted the gospel to cooperate with and share in .73 On the 
other hand, by His passion and death Jesus bore incontrovertible witness 
to His boundless and indiscriminate human love for each and every 
person on earth, and by His resurrection bore similar witness to the 
Father's love for Him and for the many who would listen to Him, join 
with Him, follow Him, and abide in Him - and, by doing so, enter into 
Jesus' divine communion with the Father and their Holy spirit. 
Admittedly, this way of understanding Jesus ' death is inconsistent 
with many received theological notions about its redemptive efficacy and 
seems inconsistent with some New Testament texts.74 But I believe that 
this interpretation is consistent with all that the Church has firmly and 
constantly taught, and recent competent exegesis supports it: 
In fact, Jesus did not search out death as a means for the 
salvation of human persons; he accepted death, in sorrow and in 
submission, as the crowning of his life of faithfulness. Jesus was 
faithful to the mission received from his Father, that of 
proclaiming the Good News concerning the God of compassion 
and concerning love for the brethren. He maintained this stance 
against enemies who wanted to silence him, by not defending 
himself with violent means and by entrusting himself without 
reserve to the God who is faithful ... 
Jesus, therefore, did not go looking for death for its own sake, 
however salutary that might be. And one can only be quite wrong 
to so interpret the words he spoke concerning his desire to drink 
the cup of his passion. Jesus simply wanted to be faithful to the 
end. He understood himself to be within that line of prophets, 
whose typical experience was one of persecution; for authentic 
service to God ends up in rousing up men and women's wrath 
against those who believe the gospel ... 
In attentively considering the interpretations Paul gave to 
Christ's death, one perceives that the sacrificial and even 
redemptive understandings of this death hold up only when they 
are definitively located in relation to Jesus' love and God 's love. 
Put in another way, when the Son surrenders himself and when the 
Father surrenders hi s Son, it is in no way for the sake of some 
chastisement nor for the sake of some satisfaction; it is for his 
remaining faithful to the mission of love.75 
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Thus, nothing requires a faithful Christian to believe either that 
Jesus intended His death or that His dying's salvific benefits in any way 
flowed from His death itself - that is, from His being dead from Friday 
until Sunday. 
Moreover, it seems to me that by meditating on the gospels as a 
whole, devout Christians can find valid grounds for denying that Jesus 
intended His death. For example, praying in the garden after the Last 
Supper, Jesus begs the father to be spared death, if possible. Jesus already 
has offered His sacrifice and, in doing so, has accepted the death He has 
foreseen. But the Father can do all things. Can the Father not spare Jesus 
while accepting the sacrifice, as once He spared Isaac while accepting 
Abraham's sacrifice? 
Yes, the father could do this. Yet He permits Jesus' betrayal, 
passion, and death. Why? While divine judgments and ways are beyond 
our comprehension, we can see, in the light of faith, that the Father 
allowed Jesus' suffering and death at least partly because they helped to 
accomplish three things: manifest the depth of the Trinity's love for us, 
motivate us to respond appropriately to that love, and show us how to do 
so despite the temptations of our fallen condition.76 
Jesus' very death (His being dead itself) was a pure privation with 
no meaning or potential for good. But Jesus' dying - that is, His perfect 
love in laying down His life - did in principle destroy death for 
everyone, because that dying overcame sin, which is the source of death 
and all human misery. And Jesus' resurrection somehow makes possible 
and brings about the resurrection of those who die united with Him in 
divine love, faithful cooperation, and eucharistic bodily intimacy.77 
Dying you destroyed our death, rising you restored our life. Lord 
Jesus, come in glory. 
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